

Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5096

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KINSHASA 7575

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FOR AF

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, CG
SUBJECT: FY 1979 BUDGET SUBMISSION FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ASSISTANCE (ISA); ZAIRE

REF: STATE 185431

1. STATUS OF FAZ REORGANIZATION PLAN: MISSION AGREES THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DELAY DEVELOPMENT OF FEFINITIVE US POSITION ON FY-79 LEVELS AND AREAS OF INPUTS UNTIL WE HAVE CLEARER VIEW OF FAZ REORGANIZATION PLAN FOR TACTICAL UNITS WHICH IS STILL BEING DRAWN UP BY FRENCH AND BELGIANS. TO DATE PROGRESS ON THE DETAILS OF THE PLAN HAS BEEN MINIMAL. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON REORGANIZATION OF THE OVERALL COMMAND/ CONTROL STRUCTURE AND THE IMMEDIATE POST-SHABA POSITIONING OF FORCES (KIN 6570). MORE CHANGES IN THIS REGARD ARE EXPECTED. THE FAZ HIERARCHY, INCLUDING MOBUTU, HAS DEVOTED ITS PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THESE IMPORTANT CHANGES AND IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON THE PHYSICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW BUREAUS AND THE SELECTION OF PERSONNEL TO FILL KEY STAFF POSITIONS. AN IMPORTANT STAFF SECTION TO BE ESTABLISHED IS THE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING BUREAU UNDER CONTROL OF THE COORDINATOR OF THE GENERAL STAFF (GENERAL BABIA). THIS BUREAU, CONSISTING OF THREE FAZ OFFICERS PLUS
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TWO FRENCH AND TWO BELGIAN OFFICERS, WILL HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING DETAILED FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLANS. THE BUREAU IS NOT EXPECTED TO BECOME OPERATIONAL FOR ANOTHER MONTH OR TWO. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE DOUBT THAT DETAILED REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO THE REORGANIZATION PLAN WILL BE AVAILABLE TO US BEFORE OCTOBER 1 OMB BUDGET SUBMISSION DEADLINE. HOWEVER, WE DO ANTICIPATE THAT CERTAIN TRENDS AND PRO

JECTIONS RELATING TO THE PLAN WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, THUS PROVIDING A BETTER FRAMEWORK THAN WE HAVE NOW FOR DETERMINING LIKELY US INPUTS. STUDIES ARE NOW UNDER WAY ON OVER-ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE; WE WILL MONITOR AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE THE PROGRESS ON SUCH STUDIES AND PROVIDE RESULTS AS SOON AS THEY ARE KNOWN.

2. MISSION SUBMITS FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON OMB OUTLINE CONTAINED PARA 3 REFTEL:

3. PART I: POINTS WERE COVERED IN OUR PARM AND OUR ASSESSMENT OF FY-79 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (KIN 6664). IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT SINCE PARM WAS WRITTEN SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSIONS OF SHABA INVASION AND MOBUTU'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF ACROSS-THE-BOARD REFORMS HAVE STRENGTHENED THE CASE FOR CONTINUATION RATHER THAN ANY SHARP DIMINUTION OF US ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

4. PART II: A. THREAT ASSESSMENT: REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. HOWEVER, WE WOULD UNDERScore OUR VIEW THAT, WHILE NOT RULING OUT POSSIBILITY OF MAIN-FORCE ATTACK FROM ANGOLA, MORE LIKELY FORM OF AGGRESSION IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE IS GUERRILLA-TYPE WARFARE. TO MEET THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY FAZ DEFENSE FORCES WILL REQUIRE INTER ALIA IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS AND HIGHER DEGREE OF GROUND AND AIR MOBILITY. THESE ARE BOTH AREAS IN WHICH GOZ HAS
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TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO US SUPPLIERS FOR EQUIPMENT PURCHASES UNDER OUR FMS PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, FAZ PERCEIVES THE NEED TO POSITION, ON A LONG-TERM BASIS, A SIZABLE FORCE IN THE WESTERN SHABA TO COUNTER THIS THREAT AND, ACCORDINGLY, WILL REQUIRE TROOP HOUSING ON A SEMI-PERMANENT BASIS.

B. FAZ MILITARY NEEDS: AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, FAZ IS CURRENTLY BEING REORGANIZED TO PROVIDE SMALLER, BETTER TRAINED, BETTER ARMED, MORE MOBILE FORCES. FOCUS IS ON CREATING THREE INFANTRY BRIGADES, ONE PARATROOP BRIGADE AND LOGISTICAL CORPS. MOST IMMEDIATE NEED IS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT TRAINING, WHICH BELGIANS AND FRENCH WILL UNDERTAKE. NEW BRIGADES MUST ALSO BE PROVIDED WITH ARMS, TRANSPORT, LOGISTICS SUPPORT INCLUDING INFRASTRUCTURE. NO NEED FOR SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT IS ANTICIPATED.

C. ABSORPTION CAPACITY: FAZ'S OVER-ALL ABILITY TO ABSORB MILITARY TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT IN THE 1978-82 PERIOD SHOULD INCREASE IF CURRENT REFORMS AND REORGANIZATION OF FAZ ARE CARRIED FORWARD. SHABA UNDERSOURED GREAT NEED FOR BASIC TRAINING AS WELL AS PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION OF JUNIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICERS. WE ANTICIPATE FAZ, WITH EMPHASIS ON BETTER RECRUITMENT AND SMALLER OVER-ALL FORCE, WILL BE ABLE TO ABSORB INCREASED BELGIAN/FRENCH INPUTS IN BASIC TRAINING WHILE CONTINUING CURRENT CONUS OFFICER EDUCATION PROGRAM. IN GENERAL, PRIORITY

WHICH MOBUTU IS PLACING ON TRAINING AT ALL LEVELS AUGURS WELL FOR MACIMUM FAZ EFFORT TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IN THIS FIELD. AS ALREADY NOTED, WE DO NOT FORESEE GOZ REQUESTS FOR MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT. FAZ'S CAPACITY TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE TYPES OF US MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEING SUPPLIED NOW AND ANTICIPATED IN THE FUTURE SHOULD IMPROVE AS OVERALL TRAINING PROGRAM IS INTENSIFIED.

D. OTHER SOURCES:

(1) TRAINING-AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, BELGIUM AND FRANCE--TRADITIONALLY THE CHIEF/WESTERN FOR FAZ MILITARY TRAINING BESIDES THE US--HAVE BOTH SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THEIR TRAINING INPUTS SINCE SHABA. BELGIUM IS NOW CONSIDERING A GOZ REQUEST FOR TOTAL OF 115 BELGIAN TRAINERS/ADVISERS: 19 FOR INFANTRY TRAINING AT KITONA, 34 TO HELP FORM THE NEW LOGISTICAL CORPS, THE REST CONFIDENTIAL

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TO SERVE AS INSTRUCTORS AT FAZ SERVICE SCHOOLS. FRANCE HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL 32 MILITARY PERSONNEL, MOST OF WHOM WILL TRAIN NEW PARATROOP BRIGADE. TOTAL FRENCH MILITARY PRESENCE WILL THUS BE INCREASED TO ABOUT 62 IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: MIRAGES (10), ENTACS (3), HELICOPTERS (4), PANHARDS (16), PARA BRIGADE (26), FAZ GENERAL STAFF (2), OTHER (3). NEITHER BELGIANS NOR FRENCH ENVISAGE INCREASES IN THEIR OFF-SHORE TRAINING PROGRAMS. WE DO NOT FORESEE ANY OTHER WESTERN OR NON-COMMUNIST CONTRY BECOMING MAJOR SOURCE OF TRAINING.

(2) EQUIPMENT-ASIDE FROM US, BELGIANS AND FRENCH HAVE BEEN MAJOR WESTERN SUPPLIERS AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN LIMITED QUANTITIES ALONG ESTABLISHED LINES. WITH THEIR CURRENT FOCUS OF INCREASING TRAINING FOR FAZ,

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ACTION AF-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5097

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KINSHASA 7575

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FOR AF

NEITHER APPEARS IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE INCREASED CREDITS FOR FAZ EQUIPMENT PURCHASES. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE IS THIRD-COUNTRY FINANCING FOR EQUIPMENT PURCHASES (AND CONCEIVABLE FOR TRAINING AS WELL). SAUDI ARABIA AND PERHAPS OTHER MIDDLE EAST MODERATES (E.G. IRAN) ARE MOST LIKELY SOURCES OF SUCH FINANCING. INDEED, IT APPEARS THAT SAUDIS HAVE AGREED TO PAY FOR AT LEAST PART OF GOZ'S SHABA INVASION EXPENSES. ACCORDING TO BELGIANS HERE, SAUDIS HAVE ALSO AGREED TO FINANCE GOZ PURCHASES OF FRENCH MATERIEL TO EQUIP NEW PARA BRIGADE WHICH FRENCH ARE FORMING AND TRAINING. WHILE WE DO NOT YET KNOW FULL EXTENT OF CURRENT OR PROSPECTIVE SAUDI FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (GOZ IS PLAYING THIS ONE CLOSE TO CHEST), IF SUSTAINED SUCH COOPERATION OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF FACILITATING A REDUCTION OF OUR OWN INPUT. PRODUCTIVE JOINT EFFORTS AMONG AFRICAN STATES SEEM LESS LIKELY, EXCEPT FOR MEETING SPECIFIC CRISES SUCH AS SHABA WHERE MOROCCANS WERE WILLING TO PROVIDE TRAINED AND EQUIPPED MANPOWER TO THE EXTENT THEY HAD SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER PARTIES.

(3) IN SUMMARY, WE BELIEVE OTHER DONORS MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN PROVIDING BOTH MILITARY TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT TO ZAIRE AND THEREBY FACILITATE OUR GRADUALLY REDUCING THE LEVELS OF OUR CURRENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH ALTERNATIVE SOURCES
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OF SUPPLY WILL REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL HANDLING. SPECIFICALLY, AS STATED IN THE SECRETARY'S RECENT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, "A SHARP CUTBACK ON THE PART OF THE US MIGHT AFFECT THE WILLINGNESS OF OTHERS TO ASSIST ZAIRE...."

5. PART III: PARAS 18 THRU 21 OF KIN 6664 WHICH EVALUATED LIKELY EFFECTS OF ZAIRE'S DEFENSE PROGRAM ON ITS ECONOMY IN THE 1978-82 PERIOD REMAIN VALID. ONLY NEW DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN REPORT OF POSSIBLE SAUDI ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS REPORTED KIN 7033. HOWEVER, SUCH POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE IS STILL TOO INDEFINITE TO BE INCLUDED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. LIKEWISE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT PROPOSED "MARSHALL PLAN" AS VISUALIZED BY BELGIANS AND FRENCH DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW MONEY OR OTHER ASSISTANCE FOR ZAIRE.

6. PART IV: SINCE 1975 THE US HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AS ZAIRE FOUND ITSELF FACED WITH A SERIOUS THREAT TO ITS SECURITY FLOWING PRINCIPALLY FROM EVENTS IN ANGOLA JUST AT A TIME WHEN THE COUNTRY WAS UNDERGOING ITS MOST SEVERE ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL CIRISIS. WHILE NEITHER THE SECURITY NOR ECONOMIC SITUATIONS HAVE YET BEEN RESOLVED, THERE

IS REASON TO HOPE THAT THE TIME OF MOST URGENT NEED IS PASSING AND WE CAN BEGIN SCALING DOWN OUR INPUTS IN BOTH AREAS. IN VIEW OF SEVERITY AND DEPTH OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, AND FACT THAT SHABA HAS SERVED AS STIMULUS TO EUROPEANS AND OTHERS TO CARRY GREATER BURDEN OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE, IN YEARS AHEAD WE SHOULD WORK TOWARD GIVING INCREASED WEIGHT TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN THE OVER-ALL MIX OF OUR MILITARY/ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS. (THIS WAS ONE OF OUR PARM RECOMMENDATIONS.) HOWEVER, THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE REDUCE OVER-ALL ASSISTANCE LEVELS AND ADJUST THE MILITARY/ECONOMIC MIX SHOULD BE CAREFULLY GEARED TO OUR ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAIRE AND NEIGHBORING AREAS AND TO THE ACTIONS OF OTHER DONORS. ASSUMING AN FY-78 FMS LEVEL SOMEWHAT BELOW THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST FOR \$30 MILLION, AND CONSIDERING

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THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S NEW ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, WE WOULD ENVISAGE A REDUCED FY-79 FMS LEVEL OF \$15-20 MILLION (CHIEF ZAMISH BELIEVES NO LOWER THAN \$20 MILLION) AS BEING THE MINIMUM REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CONTRIBUTING TO ATTAINMENT OF US POLICY OBJECTIVES. ANYTHING MUCH BELOW THAT IN FY-79 WOULD BE VIEWED AS "THE SHARP COTBACK" WHICH WE AGREE COULD HARM US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN ZAIRE. FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEARS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED, DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WE CANNOT NOW PREDICT. AS FOR THE QUESTION OF MIX WITH ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, OUR GOAL FOR FY-79 AND BEYOND SHOULD BE A GRADUAL SHIFT TOWARD GREATER RELATIVE WEIGHT ACCORDED TO DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE THIS ASSUMES A GRADUAL REDUCTION OF THE LEVEL OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ASSISTANCE, THE RATE OF REDUCTION RELATED TO THE GOZ-S OWN EFFORTS AND SUCCESS IN EFFECTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY. IF, HOWEVER, THE SCALING DOWN OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS NOT MATCHED BY MAINTENANCE OR EXPANSION OF CREDIBLE LEVELS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (OR, WORSE, IF BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE LEVELS ARE REDUCED MARKEDLY AT THE SAME TIME), THE CHANCES OF ATTAINING OUR OBJECTIVES IN ZAIRE WOULD DIMINISH SHARPLY.

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